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Brain Drain
Oﬀsetting the Development Costs?
Brain drain and the role of training
and remittances
DANIEL EGIEGBA AGBIBOA
ABSTRACT Over recent decades global labour markets have emerged and skill
shortages in particular sectors have generated an international competition for the
best and brightest. The developed world is seen to ‘poach’ this talent from poorer
countries, with the resultant ‘brain drain’ undermining their capacity to develop.
This paper calls into question the assumption that the emigration of the highly
skilled will automatically represent a loss to the country of origin. The paper
positions itself between the two extremes of brain drain as constituting a pure loss
or a pure gain for sending countries and calls for a more moderate approach to
skilledmigration and its impact on development. The paper goes beyond the simple
brain drain/brain gain dichotomy by looking at the ﬂow of the skilled within
speciﬁc geographic spaces and the resultant policy dilemmas and options.
One of the indelible marks of today’s globalised world is the emigration of
skilled workers. Despite scarce and unreliable data, evidence from Docquier
and Marfouk suggest that between 1990 and 2000 the percentage of skilled
migration from the developing to the developed world climbed from 29.8 to
34.6.1 Over recent decades global labour markets have emerged and skill
shortages in particular sectors have spawned an international jockeying for
high-skill professionals. This has motivated some countries belonging to the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—such as,
Australia, Canada, France, the USA and the UK—to put special visas in place
to ‘lure’ scarce skills to ﬁll labour shortages in their key industries.2 The
developed world is seen to be ‘poaching’ this human talent from developing
countries, with the resultant brain drain eroding the latter’s capacity to
develop.3
However, it is important to emphasise that the concept of brain drain is
decades old. It echoes back to the 1960s when it was ﬁrst used to capture the
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ﬂow of British migrants to the USA and its consequent adverse eﬀects on
Britain.4 Over time the concept of brain drain became negatively associated
with the ﬂow of skilled workers from the developing to the developed world.5
Brain drain theorists decried the ﬁscal cost of having trained emigrated
workers and the forgone tax revenues.6 The 1990s, however, experienced a
paradigm shift from the traditional emphasis on the costs of brain drain to its
‘potentially positive impacts on income, living standards, health, education
and political processes in origin countries’.7 The term ‘brain gain’ or
‘beneﬁcial brain drain’ is used to characterise this new thesis.8
Migrant remittances feature prominently on the list of beneﬁts associated
with brain drain.9 To illustrate, Ghanaian migrants remit some US$400
million yearly to their home economy, constituting Ghana’s fourth largest
source of foreign exchange earnings.10 Ghana aside, since 1979 the Chinese
diaspora has accounted for more than 70% of internal investment in China.11
This notwithstanding, the issue of remittance ﬂows leads to the critical
question: how appropriate is it to view remittances as a source of
development aid? The paper will return to consider this question much later.
For now, suﬃce it to note that the foregoing remarks have opened up an
unresolved question in the brain drain literature: brain drain or brain gain?
The rest of this paper pivots on this overriding question.
The overarching aim of the paper is to assess the brain drain or brain gain
question and to ﬂag its dual impacts on developing countries. The paper
focuses almost entirely on the role of training and remittances. Africa provides
a useful region-speciﬁc context of analysis. This is because it was revealed in
2000 that ‘one out of every eight Africans with a university education lived in a
[developed country]’,12 the highest rate among developing regions.13 The paper
will argue that the place of training of skilled migrants in developing countries
and their rising volume of remittances to their home economies oﬀsets any
signiﬁcant costs of skilled emigration for those countries. The rest of the paper
is organised as follows. The ﬁrst part examines the question of why people
move or stay behind. The second part explores the adverse eﬀects of brain
drain on the developing world, focusing on ‘medical brain drain’ in Africa and
the role of training. The third part investigates recent empirical ﬁndings on the
concept of brain gain, focusing on the role of remittances as a source of
development aid. The ﬁfth and concluding part goes beyond the simple brain
drain/brain gain dichotomy by looking at the concept of ‘brain circulation’ and
mutual gain.
To move or not to move?
At the outset it is important to emphasise that the act of moving—or
staying—is an expression of freedom which is at the heart of human
development.14 Incentives to migrate tend to be explained in the migration
literature according to a blend of ‘push factors’ and ‘pull factors’.15 The
former describes the hostile conditions (eg low wages) in the sending country
that ‘push’ people outside their country of origin; the latter captures the
favourable conditions (eg high wages) in the receiving country that ‘pull’
DANIEL EGIEGBA AGBIBOA
1670
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
us
tra
lia
n N
ati
on
al 
Un
ive
rsi
ty]
 at
 21
:24
 02
 Ju
ne
 20
13
 
migrants towards their destination country.16 Having this caveat in mind, the
paper proceeds to discuss some of the major push–pull factors driving
migration.
The decision tomigrate is typically motivated by the assumption that a move
will ameliorate one’s standard of living by consolidating or diversifying one’s
sources of income.17 Many migration scholars highlight the important role of
per capita income diﬀerentials across nations as a major driver of migration.18
For example, in 2000 per capita income in the USA was $34 500, while in
Mexico it stood at $9700. Such disparity in the level of income between both
countries—estimated at $25 000—creates a huge economic incentive for
Mexicans to move to the USA.19 Another stark illustration is Kenya, where
a doctor’s monthly salary is less than $256.20 If that doctor decides to move to
the USA, he or she could earn forty times as much.21
But wage diﬀerentials only partly explain movement patterns. Economic
crisis can also impel prospective migrants to move. A case in point is the
economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which has ‘pushed’ many migrants to
neighbouring South Africa, with over three million Zimbabweans ﬂeeing
there.22 However, theories that emphasise purely economic factors fail to
capture the broader social framework in which decisions are taken.23
Prospective migrants are inﬂuenced by migrant networks, including families
and friends who have migrated previously. These networks smooth the path
for prospective migrants by reducing the costs and risks involved in moving,
ﬁnding a job and accessing resources in the host country.24 Supporting
evidence from the USA shows that three-quarters of all legal permanent
migrants are made up of relatives of those who have previously migrated.25
In addition, political crisis may also impinge on migration ﬂow. For example,
over 500 000 Chileans ﬂed to Argentina during the 1970s when socialist
Salvador Allende Gossens was repressed by General Augusto Pinochet.26
However, in 2002 Argentina’s ﬁnancial crisis sharply reduced the number of
Chilean e´migre´s there. It is important to underscore that the decision to
migrate is not just made by individuals—it often represents risk-spreading
livelihood strategies pursued by households and families in the developing
world, not least sub-Saharan Africa.27 For example, ‘villages in Senegal
sometimes pool resources to pay for the migration expenses of their most
skilled young men’.28
A balanced study should also consider why people stay behind. Needless to
say, the majority of people do not move. This is often attributed to the high
cost—monetary and non-monetary—of moving. Monetary costs includes
money paid for air or train tickets, shipping costs, legal costs, the costs of
searching for jobs, and the opportunity cost of forgone earnings in the
country of origin.29 Of course, the maze of immigration restrictions also puts
a cap on emigration. The diﬀerential access to social and economic resources
means that wealthy people and societies generally tend to be more mobile
compared with poor people and societies.30 This challenges the popular view
that poverty is the main driver of migration taking place within and from
developing countries. On the ﬂip side there is the non-monetary cost of
migration, such as the psychological burden of leaving one’s family and
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friends. The major social costs of migration are summarily captured in the
2009 Human Development Report (HDR):
Migrants who leave friends and family may face loneliness, may feel unwelcome
among people who fear or resent newcomers [as was recently the case with the
xenophobic attacks in South Africa], may lose their jobs or fall ill and thus be
unable to access the support services they need in order to prosper.31
Further, academic discrimination may compel many skilled migrants to work
in unrelated ﬁelds.32 For example, the USA often fails to recognise the
academic qualiﬁcations of many university-educated African emigrants.33 This
results in brain waste or loss of investment in human capital as skilled migrants
are compelled to turn to less-skilled positions, such as taxi-driving, cooking or
factory work.34 In a recent study of the US job market, Ratha et al found that
‘immigrants with bachelor’s degrees from 7 of 15 African countries surveyed
have less than a 40 percent chance of ending up in a skilled job’.35 This brings
into bold relief the scale of brain waste among African skilled migrants.
Shifting focus to country-speciﬁc contexts, the following section explores the
phenomenon of medical brain drain in Africa and how it leads to severe
workforce shortages. The scope of discussion in this section is limited to the
health sector because it has been highlighted as the ‘exceptional’ aspect of brain
drain.36 As Skeldon argues, ‘A country might be able to bear the loss of a
chemist or physicist, but not a doctor’.37 This section will also reﬂect on the
under-researched role of training.
Brain drain and the role of training
In 2006 a study by the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported that 57
countries worldwide suﬀered from a severe shortage of health workers.
Thirty-six of these were located in Africa, which has just 3% of global health
workers but bears 24% of the global burden of disease.38 Ghana is an
illustrative case. Over half of Ghanaian doctors work outside their country of
origin. In 2006 alone Ghana lost an estimated $60 million in investment and
training of health workers.39 The outﬂow of Ghanaian health workers
seriously undermines the capacity of the Ghanaian health sector to function
properly, as many hospitals become severely understaﬀed. A study by Kapur
and McHale suggested that in Ghana there is one doctor per 16 000
inhabitants.40 This ﬁgure falls dismally below the internationally required
standard of a minimum of one doctor per 5000 people.41 This is in marked
contrast to a top migrant destination country like the USA, where there is
roughly one doctor per 430 people.42 The case of Malawi is much worse. It is
estimated that there are just two doctors for every 100 000 people—the
highest rate in the world.43 In the Lilongwe Central Hospital in Malawi a
single nurse often looks after 50 or more critically sick patients.44 This is
corroborated by an earlier study by Dugger, which shows that ‘At Lilongwe
Central, an 830-bed hospital, there are supposed to be 532 nurses. Only 183
are left.’45 Yet the United Nations Global Commission on International
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Migration curiously reports that the city of Manchester holds more
Malawian doctors than in all of AIDS-stricken Malawi.46
South Africa is yet another country that has been incapacitated by medical
brain drain. The situation in the country is dire because it is reported to have
the highest HIV/AIDS infection rate in the world.47 Medical brain drain in
South African is partly responsible for the shortage of health workers to deal
with the long queue of patients who arrive daily at hospitals and clinics. This
lack of health workers is surprising when we consider that South African
doctors and nurses make up 10% of the medical staﬀ in Canada.48 In 2004
the South African government asked the Canadian government to stop
recruiting its health personnel.49 According to Alkire and Chen, the total loss
to South Africa of training emigrated health workers is around one-third of
the development aid received by the country between 1994 and 2000.50
Despite the paucity of nurses in South Africa, a study by the OECD in 2004
showed that some 32 000 vacancies existed in the public sector and there were
another 35 000 registered nurses who were unemployed.51 This implies that
migration may be the symptom, and not the cause, of failing health care
systems.
Ethiopia is another country severely aﬀected bymedical brain drain. A study
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) shows that between
1980 and 1991 Ethiopia lost 75% of its skilled workforce.52 Although it
produces many excellent doctors, there are more Ethiopian doctors in Chicago
than in Ethiopia.53 In Mozambique and Liberia over 75% of the doctors and
81% of the nurses, respectively, work abroad.54 In 2005 the WHO reported that
the number of doctors exiting Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe and Uganda
represented more than 30% of the resident stock of doctors.55 One year later
a WHO report announced that 34% of Zimbabwean nurses were working in
developed countries.56 However, Skeldon cautions that data used to assess the
above ﬂows often only account for those doctors or nurses who are registered
with the oﬃcial professional bodies in the respective countries; other doctors or
nurses who enter the country under diﬀerent categories and pursue non-
medical occupations are often not captured.57
In absolute numbers most skilled health workers emerge in middle-income
nations as opposed to the poorest nations.58 This is because ‘the poorest
countries do not have the facilities to train large numbers of skilled workers,
irrespective of sector’.59 For example, 11 out of 48 sub-Saharan African
countries are without internationally standardised graduate medical
schools.60 Hence, the medical qualiﬁcations of these graduates are often
rejected by host countries, resulting in brain waste, as earlier noted. Some
authors argue that the beneﬁts of skilled emigration for destination countries
are considerable. Using the UK as an example, Eastwood et al argue that,
while the cost of training a doctor is estimated at £225 000, a skilled migrant
doctor is readily available at little or zero cost.61 Although some migrant
doctors may require extra training to bring them up to local standards, the
net savings are still likely to be substantial. For example, doctors and nurses
recruited from Ghana since 1998 have saved the UK an estimated training
cost of £65 million and £38 million, respectively.62
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One of the limitations of the above studies is their failure to consider
the place of training of many skilled migrants in developed countries. As
noted by Skeldon, many of the foreign-born doctors in developed
countries may have received their advanced training in these countries.
Skeldon argues that it is misleading to simply associate data showing
birthplace with data showing medical occupation. This is because data
showing the place of training, year of arrival and current occupation, are
unintelligible.63 Data from a UN study show that roughly 55% of skilled
migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean based in the USA had
received their training in the USA.64 Another study by Johnson shows
that around 68% of the foreign-born scientists conducting research in the
USA in 1999 had been trained there.65 Further evidence from the WHO
indicates that one-quarter of physicians in the major destination countries
(see Table 1) for migrants received their training abroad.66 In some cases,
while a skilled migrant may have received their foundational training in a
developing country, further training was completed in the developed
world.67
Any balanced scholarship on brain drain ought to consider the source(s)
of funding of skilled workers from developing countries. Take the
educational sector as an illustrative case. It is rather simplistic to think
that the country of origin is the sole provider of funding. Many students
from the developing world are regular recipients of non-state transnational
transfers.68 According to the Institute of International Education’s annual
Open Doors Survey, 61% of internal students studying in the USA came
from developing countries in the 2007–08 academic year. Their education
was highly subsidised through ‘fellowships, assistantships, and stipend’.69
The return of skilled migrants enriches the human capital of their home
country and enhances wealth creation, while those who remain behind
contribute to their home economy via remittances (as section four shows).
At times the cost of funding is borne by the family of the student, as
education becomes ever more privatised.70 In the USA between 1979 and
TABLE 1. Top 10 immigration countries: number of Immigrants, 2010
Immigration Countries Percentage of immigrants
USA 48.2
Russian Federation 12.3
Germany 10.8
Saudi Arabia 7.3
Canada 7.2
UK 7.0
Spain 7.9
France 6.7
Australia 5.5
India 5.4
Source: Adapted from World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2011.
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2004 the number of foreign students who depended on their family or
personal resources stood at 60%.71 According to this source, universities
in the USA funded over 45% of foreign students during this period.72
The evidence of external funding for skilled migrants from developing
countries challenges the appropriateness of the compensation thesis, which
argues that the developed world should recompense the developing world for
‘poaching’ their human talent and thus precluding their development.73
Contrary to this claim, the issue of funding raises the question of ‘who should
be reimbursed for the cost of generating skills’.74 This aside, some migration
scholars have argued that the majority of doctors everywhere are products of
elite families who are typically concentrated in urban areas and seldom in
rural areas. So conceived, the emigration of medical doctors is unlikely to
have a real positive impact on areas where the need is greatest.75 Another issue
is the reluctance of medical doctors to work in the rural areas even in more
developed African countries like South Africa. This explains why developing
countries often have to resort to the costly alternative of importing doctors
from countries such as Cuba to ﬁll the locally vacated space, with over 186
Cuban doctors in Ghana in 2006 and some 450 Cuban doctors and nurses in
South Africa in 2000.76 According to a UN study, over $4 billion is spent
yearly on the salaries of around 100 000 Western expatriates in sub-Saharan
Africa.77
So far, the paper has shown howmedical brain drain undermines the ability
of the African health sector to function properly. The question, then, is, how
can the scale of (medical) brain drain be controlled to give a nation the
equipoise it needs? Skeldon proposes training systems in the developing world
that produce medical doctors who are ‘not marketable internationally but
who are needed locally’. Thus Skeldon backs a ‘system of training . . . in which
doctors and nurses are trained in one tier to international standard . . . but
many others are trained in another tier to more basic levels of health care’.78
However, Skeldon’s proposal is likely to lead to a slippery slope: how far can
we go in lowering the training standards for medical doctors in developing
countries? Where exactly do we draw the line between so called ‘ﬁrst-tier’ and
‘second-tier’ system of training? Over time Skeldon’s proposal may engender
the training of doctors who are decidedly mediocre, and who may end up
jeopardising the lives of patients entrusted to their care. In short, Skeldon fails
to ask a more basic question: why is medical brain drain so preponderant in
Africa?
According to the HDR, the best response to the question of brain drain is to
‘address underlying structural problems’.79 In this connection a qualitative
study conducted in 2009 by Plurpol Consulting provides reasons why medical
brain drain is especially rife in Africa. The following factors emerged strongly
from interviewed participants: 1) ‘the pressure of working on crowded wards
with few drugs and little essential equipment’; 2) ‘meagre salaries’; 3) ‘limited
opportunities for promotion or development’; and 4) ‘a general feeling of
being undervalued’.80 Against this backdrop, policy makers in the developing
world are well advised to focus more on improving their overall incentive
systems to ensure talent retention, circulation and return. These incentives
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include: 1) putting in place an adequate reward structure; 2) having attractive
career possibilities for motivated and talented professionals and innovators
in their home countries to undertake creative work; 3) increasing the
availability of public resources to support promising research; 4) creating a
merit-oriented culture in the public sector; and 5) curbing or doing away with
bureaucracy that increases the cost of doing productive business for the
private sector.81 The experience of South Korea in the 1980s oﬀers a
blueprint for Africa. By improving its incentive systems, the South Korean
government remarkably managed to ‘lure’ back 75% of its US-educated
nationals with doctorates in science and engineering.82 China is a country
that has since followed in the footsteps of South Korea—attracting its
diaspora (see Figure 1). In Africa countries like Ghana, Eritrea and Rwanda
are already leading the way.83
Having examined the eﬀects of medical brain drain in many African
countries, as well as the role of training, the next section explores the impor-
tant question of whether brain drain can ever have a positive impact on
sending countries. This question ties in with that of brain gain and
remittances.
Brain gain and the role of remittances
It is time to stop deploring the ‘‘brain drain’’ from Southern countries to the
industrialised world, to stop regarding the departure of researchers and
engineers to Northern countries as a pure loss for developing countries.84
FIGURE 1. Students returning from overseas to China.
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The opening words of Barre´ and his colleagues capture the more optimistic
view of brain drain which, as earlier stated, featured prominently in the
1990s. During this period many authors argued that the emigration of
skilled workers created an incentive for more people to become educated.85
Stark and Fan theorised that it is the ‘possibility of migration that induces
individuals in a developing country to acquire higher education’.86 This is
evident in the Philippines, where individuals join nursing programmes
mainly because they want to give a ﬁllip to their chances of moving
overseas.87 While the greater prospect of migration may induce education
in a developing country, Kapur and McHale argue that it may equally
reduce public supply, as government may be reluctant to ﬁnance the
education of students who will end up beneﬁtting foreign countries.88 Some
have also argued that skilled migration provides talented people in the
developing world with the opportunity to realise their potential, which may
never be actualised if they stay put in their country of origin.89 Put
diﬀerently, ‘the real question is whether such skilled labour would have
been productive if migrants had stayed’.90 This argument is what is usually
referred to as the brain-in-the-drain.91
No discussion of brain gain will be complete without probing the role of
remittances as an appropriate source of development aid (recall that this issue
was raised in the introduction to this paper). By way of disambiguation the
word ‘development’ is used here to capture the expansion of people’s
capabilities to control their lives. Expansions in this capability are in fact an
expansion of the choices open to individuals and therefore of their freedom.92
Over recent decades scholars have theorised that, when it comes to exploring
the nexus between migration and development, remittances matter.93 This is
because of the rising volume of remittances to the developing world. For
example, in 1970, remittances were $2 billion; in 1990 they were $31.1 billion;
in 2000 they were $76.8 billion; in 2005 they were $167.8 billion; and in 2010
they were $440 billion. As a matter of interest remittances to Africa
quadrupled between 1990 and 2010, reaching almost $40 billion in 2010.94
This excludes the unrecorded ﬂows that occur via informal channels. Indeed,
some writers argue that informal remittance ﬂows could be equal to, or even
outstrip, oﬃcial ﬁgures of remittances to Africa.95 In any case, data from the
World Bank (2011) show that, as of 2011, Africa’s largest income was
funnelled via remittances.96
The rising volume of remittance ﬂows to the developing world decreases
poverty, increases investment expenditures, funds basic consumption needs,
ﬁnances health care and education, and provides start-up capital for family-
run businesses.97 In a series of household surveys in Africa, conducted on
behalf of the World Bank, Ratha et al discovered that ‘remittance-receiving
households have greater access to secondary and tertiary education, and
banking than households that do not receive remittances’. The surveys in
Africa also showed that ‘the average amount of remittances received by
households from outside Africa is larger than that of intraregional and
domestic remittances’.98 This lends credence to an earlier World Bank study
which found that the top sources of remittances for sub-Saharan Africa are the
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European Union (with 41% of inﬂows) and the USA (with 28%). Compared
to other ﬂows—eg foreign direct investment (FDI) and oﬃcial development
assistance (ODA)—remittance ﬂows are less volatile (see Figure 2).99
The stability of remittance ﬂows suggests that ‘they can potentially ease
access to, and lower borrowing costs for international capital’. Also, because
migrant transfers entail cross-border ﬂows of relatively modest sums of money,
‘they enable low-income households to access formal ﬁnancial services’.100
However, Ratha and his team of experts warn that ‘the complexity of the
growth process and the problems of cross-country growth regressions make it
diﬃcult to determine whether remittances increase growth rates’.101
Whatever the case, Liberia is illustrative of a country that relies on
remittances to meet the sustenance of daily livelihoods and to oﬀer
employment opportunities to returning refugees.102 Twenty-six percent of
Liberia’s annual gross domestic product of $574.5 million is remittance-
based. If we measure this against its growth rate of 7.9%, it translates into a
yearly capital infusion of roughly $149 million.103 These ﬁgures do not take
into account the informal sector, which accrues remittances of roughly
$300 million.104 Antwi-Boateng argues that ‘Liberians living in Minneapolis
remit on average US$3500 per annum to relatives in Liberia’, He adds,
‘about 60 percent of those who remit support ten or more relatives, while a
third supports about twenty relatives’.105 Somalia, a country without a
central government since 1991, is a prime example of the vital impact of
remittances. The Somalian economy is more dependent on remittances than
any other country in the world.106 With an employment rate hovering near
FIGURE 2. Remittance ﬂows to sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: S Gupta, C Pattillo & S Wagh, ‘Making remittances work for Africa’,
Finance & Development, 44(2), 2007, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/
2007/06/gupta.htm.
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47%, the estimated $1 billion ﬂow of remittances ﬁnances daily consumption
and ameliorates other hardships caused by decades of fratricidal wars.107 In
Zimbabwe remittances have now displaced tobacco as the key source of
foreign earnings.108 No wonder the World Bank asserts that, ‘the diaspora of
developing countries can be a source of capital, trade, investment, knowledge
and technology transfers’.109
One of the evident shortfalls of the empirical remittance literature is its one-
sided focuson remittances and the economic impacts ofmigration, to theneglect
of the diﬃcult-to-quantify ‘social, cultural, political and gendered impacts of
[skilled] migration’.110 Yet, based on a capabilities-based approach to
development, these neglected areas play a signiﬁcant role in improving people’s
capabilities to take control of their lives.111 Consider the US-based Liberian
diaspora and its immense contributions to political transformation in war-torn
Liberia. These contributions haveoften beenoperationalised via variousmeans,
such as ‘lobbying for and against homeland government, online media
campaigns, public service and institutional capacity building, agenda setting,
personal appeals to family members to support prodemocracy parties, and
funding political parties instead of rebels’.112 Such political contributions of the
US-based Liberian diaspora ﬁnd parallels with the US-based Cuban migrant
population, who used remittances to support anti-Castro activity, and the US-
based Irish immigrants who are known to have ﬁnanced the Irish Republican
Army in Northern Ireland. More recently the US-based Liberian diaspora
succeeded in lobbying theUS government to cancel all $391million of Liberia’s
debt. 113Themonies saved are vital for the rehabilitationof former child soldiers
and for poverty reduction in the war-torn country. While migrant remittances
are vital for expanding people’s capabilities, ‘it would be naive to expect that
remittances alone can solve more structural development obstacles’.114
The ﬁnal point of this section is what this paper terms ‘household drain’.
This starts from the premise that not all skilled migrants do well in their host
country. This should hardly be surprising if we bear in mind the apt words of
Kuznetsov: ‘Leaving the home country is an act of risk-taking, a ‘‘leap of
faith’’’.115 A good number of skilled migrants roam the streets of developed
countries searching for jobs (without much luck) and often have to fall back
on resources from already struggling household members, thus spreading the
risks from migrants to those at home. This drains households of their vital
resources, pushing them further into the poverty trap and seriously
undermining their own ability to respond to new opportunities or to cope
with additional livelihood stress. Household drain challenges the traditional
one-directionality of remittances as always involving transfers from destina-
tion to source country, and seldom the other way round.
Conclusion
This paper has assessed the question of brain drain or brain gain, while
focusing on the role of training and remittances. The paper delineated the
positive and negative impacts of brain drain on developing countries, using
Africa as a region-speciﬁc context. In particular, the paper called into
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question the assumption that the emigration of the highly skilled would
automatically represent a loss to the sending country. After providing
snapshots of the incapacitating eﬀects of medical brain drain in Africa, the
paper underscored the less studied role of remittances as an economic safety
valve for failed or fragile economies in the continent, such as Somalia and
Liberia. Perhaps the strongest point of this paper is its moderate view that
brain drain has a dual impact on sending countries—the costs of brain drain
are oﬀset against its gains. Yet the positive impact of remittances on
development writ large, as corroborated by recent empirical remittance
literature,116 may suggest that the gains of brain drain are steadily
outstripping its strains.
At the time of writing, eﬀorts are underway to mobilise diaspora resources
for development in Africa, following the recent launching of the African
Diaspora Initiative (ADI) by the World Bank. Moreover, the World Bank is
working together with the African Union and the EU to establish a new
African Remittances Institute (ARI). Whatever the merits of these laudable
initiatives, policy makers in both the developing and the developed world will
do well to keep an open mind when it comes to the impacts of brain drain and
relevant policy recommendations. On a ﬁnal note, the recommendation of
this paper is to move away from the narrow concept of brain drain and to
start talking about the more useful concept of brain circulation, where the
emigration of skilled workers is seen as beneﬁting both sides, and not as
beneﬁting one country at the expense of another. This is because a critical
reading of the empirical literature leads to the conclusion that the issue of
brain drain is not an ‘either/or’ but a ‘both/and’ question.
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